The Court held that the Administrative Trademark Committee erred in finding that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. In particular, it found that although the two marks are phonetically similar, the intervener’s mark also contains a second word, which is of particular importance, as it constitutes a characteristic of the goods and services provided by the intervening company to consumers. The Court further held that the intervener’s mark is visually distinct from the applicant’s mark due to the figurative representation it includes.
The differentiation described in the judgment is sufficient for the average consumer to be able to distinguish between the two marks at issue, taking into account that the goods and services for which those marks were registered are not mass-consumption goods, but specialised products and services directed mainly at well-informed and attentive consumers, and, above all, that the two marks are intended to distinguish different goods and services. According to the Court, there is no identity between the goods and services designated by the respective marks. Consequently, it held that there is not such a degree of similarity between the two marks as would allow the relevant public to make a mental association between them, and that the filing of the mark at issue does not give rise to a likelihood of confusion or association on the part of the relevant public.